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Germany 91 13I. Introduction
In the eighties, the relatively low ratio of U.S. national
saving has been increasingly criticized. Many observers were
concerned about its continued decline and the widening gap
between the U.S. savings ratio and that of many other indus-
trial countries. The savings rate decreased from an average of
7.9 p.c. in the period from 1973 to 1980 to an average of 3.2
p.c. between 1981 and 1987 (Table 1). In particular, the
relatively low and declining U.S. propensity to save has at
least partly been made responsible for the United States
becoming a net importer of capital since 1982, and for their
running a large current account deficit at the same time. This
is viewed as violating the "general rule" that a relatively
rich country should export capital rather than compete with
developing countries for internationally mobile capital and
thereby driving up borrowing costs for those countries. The
behavior of countries like West Germany - having a relatively
high propensity to save, exporting more capital than importing,
and thus running large current account surpluses - is therefore
considered more appropriate.
Very often the gap between U.S., German, as well as many other
countries' net national saving is overstated due to the fact
that, in the United States, government expenditures are always
counted as (government) consumption, whereas other countries
generally distinguish between government consumption and
government investment, the latter being included in national
saving. But even taking this conceptual difference into account
by eliminating government investment from the German savings
figure, U.S. net national saving remains low relative to that
of Germany (Table 1). • °l
Apart from the large federal budget deficit which has contri-
buted considerably to the low rate of saving in the United
States during the eighties, the relatively low and declining
savings rate of U.S. private households has attracted much- 2 -

































Net national and personal saving, respectively, as percentage of net
national product at market prices minus net transfer payments to the rest
of the world.- Excluding government investment.
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President.
Washington 1988.- U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, Vol. 68, Washington 1988, No. 8.- Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe
1.3: Konten und Standardtabellen. Wiesbaden 1987.- Own estimates.
attention in recent years. Personal saving amounted on
average to more than 95 p.c. of net national saving from 1973
to 1987 both in the United States and Germany. Hence the
decline in the personal savings ratio, as has happened in the
United States in the fifteen years up to 1987 had a quite
strong impact on national saving. Unfortunately, the criticism
of the low savings activity of private households in the United
States often gives the impression that U.S. households behave
irrationally, while, for example, German households are wise
enough to save for the future. In reality, the different
savings behavior can be attributed to various factors determi-
ning it which vary across countries, such as the structure of
the population and the tax system, and specific savings incen-
tives.
Cf. Alan Greenspan, "The most important issues of U.S.
economic policy". In: Deutsche Bundesbank, Ausziige aus
Presseartikeln. Frankfurt a.M., June 28, 1988, p. 10.- 3 -
In this paper the problems involved in comparing the U.S. and
German personal savings ratios are discussed and an attempt is
made to calculate the U.S. savings ratio using the German
concept. Subsequently, various factors are examined that have
contributed to the difference in the savings activity of
private households in the United States and Germany.
II. Comparing U.S. and German Personal Savings Ratios
Private households' saving, which is that part of disposable
personal income that is not used for consumption but for the
accumulation of wealth, can only be obtained indirectly. One
way of doing so is to calculate saving as the difference
between disposable personal income and consumption of private
households based on the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA). This calculation method guarantees that the accumula7
tion of financial as well as physical wealth is.taken into
account. However, inaccuracies involved in measuring personal
income and private consumption, which are not uncommon, can
lead to considerable errors in the calculation of the personal
savings ratio. If, for example, given an underlying savings
rate of 5 p.c, the disposable personal income were measured
5 p.c. higher than its true value, this would lead to a calcu-
lated savings ratio of almost 10 p.c, nearly doubling the true
ratio. Another method of obtaining the savings rate indirectly
is to calculate the difference between private households'
wealth accumulation and additional borrowing from the Flow of
2 Funds Accounts. Here, inaccuracies are also likely to occur,
as the data on the sector of private households are generally
obtained indirectly from the data on the government and busi-
ness sectors. In addition, the measurement of expenditures on
housing is often incomplete.
For a discussion on this subject cf. Deutsche Bundesbank "Die
Sparquote der privaten Haushalte in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich". Monatsberichte,
Vol. 36, Frankfurt a.M. , 1984, No. 1, pp. 30-35.
2 ' " '
Cf. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of
Funds Accounts. Washington, various issues.- 4 -
In Germany, personal saving is generally calculated from the
German Flow of Funds Accounts (gesamtwirtschaftliche Finanzie-
rungsrechnung). Since the information contained in these
2
tables is used to construct the German NIPA (VGR ), the diffe-
rence between disposable personal income and consumption as
shown in the NTPA is identical with the saving computed di-
rectly from the Flow of Funds Accounts. In general, the German
personal savings figure does not account for the accumulation
of physical wealth. The only exception are funds which are used
in connection with building loan contracts; when building and
loan associations return accumulated funds to households so
that they can acquire real estate or when credits are paid back
by the households, these actions are considered as saving, or,
to be exact, this shift from financial to physical wealth does
not lower the personal savings ratio.
In the United States, the Department of Commerce uses the NIPA
to calculate the official personal savings figure. The amount
of saving that can be computed on the basis of the Flow of
Funds Accounts differs from it quite considerably. Even after
differences in definition are accounted for, for the period
from 1973 to 1987, the Flow of Funds measure is still an
average $18 billion or roughly 15 p.c. higher than the NIPA
4 measure.
1
Cf. Zahleniibersichten und methodische Erlauterungen zur
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Finanzierungsrechnung der Deutschen
Bundesbank 1960-1987, Deutsche Bundesbank, Sonderdrucke
No. 4. Frankfurt a.M., July 1988, and Renate Hornung-Draus,
"Das Vermogen der privaten Haushalte in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Bestand, Entwicklung und Verteilung". Jahrbiicher




There are nevertheless two different official measures for
the German savings ratio, namely that of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank and that of the Statistisches Bundesamt, the difference
being that only the latter includes claims against firm-owned
pension funds in personal saving and is therefore slightly
higher than the former.
4
Before the Flow of Funds Accounts were revised recently, the
discrepancy even amounted to $31 billion on average. For the
new estimates see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System: Flow of Funds Accounts, Second Quarter 1988, Annual
Revisions. Washington 1988.- 5 -
There are several reasons why the official U.S. personal
savings ratio is not comparable to the official German ratios.
One reason is that in the United States all funds that are
either accumulated or immediately used to finance residential
construction or to purchase real estate are included in the
measure of personal saving. In Germany, on the other hand, this
is only true for funds used in connection with a building loan
contract. In addition, consumption expenditures financed by
mortgage credits lower personal saving according to the U.S.
measure. This is not the case according to the German measure
since by definition mortgage credits are not attributed to the
household sector; instead, they are ascribed to residential
construction which is included in the German business sector.
Finally, the treatment of noncorporate firms differs between
the two countries. In the United States, these firms are
counted completely as private households, whereas in Germany
only the funds extracted for private purposes, be it consump-
tion or saving, are considered in the household sector. How-
ever, the importance of such noncorporate firms is much greater
2 • "•••••
in Germany than in the United States.
Attempts to make the U.S. and German personal savings ratios
comparable have been only partly successful so far since some
of the underlying data are gathered and structured differently
in the two countries. Figure 1 shows a modified U.S. savings
ratio computed according to a method developed by the Deutsche
Bundesbank in 1984. Here the U.S. Flow of Funds data are used
to compute the difference between the households' net financial
Nevertheless, the savings ratio of German private households
rdoes decline slightly since consumption and thereby personal
income - the sum of consumption and saving - is raised.
2
In Germany, the ratio between gross income of noncorporate
firms and the compensation of employees amounts to roughly
30 p.c. which more than doubles the corresponding U.S. ratio.
Cf. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the
President. Washington 1988, and Statistisches Bundesamt,
Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 1:
Konten und Standardtabellen. Wiesbaden' 1987.
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1Based on disposable income of private households. -^According to the Deutsche Bundesbank.-3Method of
calculation described in the text.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow
of Funds Accounts. Washington, var. issues.- Council of
Economc Advisers, Economic Report of the President.
Washington 1988.- Deutsche Bundesbank, Zahlenubersich-
ten und methodische Erlauterungen zur gesamtwirtschaft-
lichen Finanzierungsrechnung der Deutschen Bundesbank
1960-1987, Sonderdrucke, No. 4, Frankfurt a.M., July
1988.- Own calculations.
investment and their increase in credit (excluding mortgage
credit since this is not included in the German measure ei-
ther) . This figure is diminished by the households' net in-
vestment in noncorporate business, and by credits from gov-
ernment insurance which are neither included in the German nor
the NIPA savings measure. Finally, half the discrepancy between
the adjusted NIPA and the Flow of Funds savings measure,
averaging $18 billion for the period from 1973 to 1987 as
mentioned above, is added to each year's calculated figure.
Since this position has , always been negative, its exclusion
leads to an increase in saving.- 7 -
However, this method also has major problems. In particular, it
does not include funds used by households for construction in
connection with building loan contracts which are included in
the German savings measure; this would raise the U.S. savings
ratio. Not deducting the mortgage loans implies, on the other
hand, that all the consumption expenditures which are financed
by such loans (which are quite considerable in the United
States) do not lower the computed savings ratio as would be
desirable. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude from
this exercise that the true gap between the savings ratios of
private households in the United States and in Germany is not
as high as implied by the official figures, but that it is
nevertheless substantial. How this gap can be explained will be
discussed in the remainder of this paper.
III. Influences on the Savings Behavior of U.S. and German
Households
Apart from the business cycle causing temporary changes in the
personal savings ratios which will not be discussed here, there
are various factors that affect, the savings behavior of private
households independently of such short-run fluctuations. These
include the population structure., the participation in the
labor force, tax incentives, and changes in financial and stock
markets.
1. Population Structure
One important determinant of the personal savings ratio in a
2
country is the age structure of its population. This is an
Cf. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1987/88 United States. Paris, May
1988.
2
Cf. Peter Sturm, Determinants of Saving: Theory and evidence.
OECD Economic Studies, No. 1, Paris, August 1983, and John W.
Graham, "International Differences in Saving Rates and the
Life Cycle Hypothesis". European Economic Review, Vol. 31,
1987, pp. 1509-1529.- 8 -
implication of the life cycle hypothesis, which states that the
savings ratio of a household is low when the head of the house-
hold enters working life, rises . subsequently, and becomes
ai
2
negative after retirement. By and large, this hypothesis is
confirmed by empirical evidence.
In the United States, the birth rate was quite high from the
end of the WorldvWar II until the, beginning of the sixties. As
a consequence, the population share of the age group from 20 to
34 years (which predominantly consists of.those people who have
not yet finished education or who have not been working for
long) started to increase remarkably at the beginning of the
seventies., In accordance with the life cycle hypothesis, this
age group has a relatively low savings ratio. Since 1981, it
has stagnated at a high level (Table 2). In Germany, on the
other hand, the babyboom did not start until late in the
fifties. Therefore the corresponding population share has
increased only since the late seventies. Hence, in the United
States, the population share of the 20- to 34-year olds has.
been an average 4 percentage points higher than in Germany for
the past fifteen years. Although it is also correct that the
share of the older population (65 years old and over) which has
a relatively . low savings • ratio averaged 3 percentage points
more in Germany than in the United States for the same period,
this effect on the aggregate savings ratio was probably more
than compensated by the (6 percentage points) higher German
share of the 35- to 64-year olds which have a relatively high
savings ratio. On the whole, the different age structure of the
1
Cf. Franco Modigliani, Albert Ando, "The Life Cycle Hypo-
thesis of Saving". American Economic Review, Vol. 53, 1963,
pp. 55-84.
o
Empirical studies do not generally confirm that wealth
declines after retirement; nevertheless, the savings ratio
declines. Two major arguments for the still positive savings
ratio are that the time of death is uncertain and the wish
exists to leave a bequest. Cf. Thad Mirer, "The, Wealth-Age
Relationship Among the Aged". American Economic Review, Vol.
69, 1979, pp. 435-443. •
Cf. OECD, Economic Surveys, United , States, Paris, November
1979, p. 39.- 9 -
Table 2 - Age Structure and Female Labor Force Participation in the United
States and Germany from 1973 to 1987 - Population Shares.
United














































































































































Not taking into account the results of the census in May 1987.- Share of
female labor force (in Germany: using the microcensus data) in the total
female population with the age of at least 16 years.- Partly estimated.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports and Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States. Washington var. issues.-
Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesre-
publik Deutschland. Wiesbaden, var.issues.- Own calculations.
population seems to explain to a considerable extent why in
Germany the households' savings ratio has been higher in the
fifteen years up to 1987 than in the United States. Further-
more, the change in the age structure partly helps to explain
the long-run downward trend of the savings ratios in both
countries.- 10 -
2. Female Labor Force Participation
Apart from the age structure, the labor force participation,
particularly that of women, influences the savings behavior of
households. When women enter the labor force, the household
income increases. This does increase the household's ability to
save. However, there are several reasons in favor of an in-
crease of the household's consumption propensity as a second
2 household member (generally the woman) enters the labor force.
First, the risk of a total income loss through unemployment is
generally lower in a two-earner household as compared to one
4
where only one person earns the household income. Therefore,
it is unlikely that savings as a precaution against income loss
will increase at the same rate as income. Furthermore
7, the
reduced income uncertainty should cause the banks to increase
the household's credit line by more than its rise in income. In
addition, precautionary savings for unexpected expenditures,
e.g., ,as a consequence of an accident, are not likely to
increase by much, because the corresponding risk should only
rise slightly if at all with the woman's entrance into working
life. Finally, with two people working, additional expenditures
become necessary as, for example, for durable consumer goods
such as freezers and microwave
1 ovens and expenditures for child
care. Generally, services which had previously been produced at
home, thus not being included in the NIPA, are now increasingly
demanded and paid for. This also increases the base of the sa-
While the age structure of the population is by and large
exogenous, especially the female labor force participation
can be influenced considerably by economic policy. For
example, a relatively high progressivity of tax rates may
especially discourage the job search of (married) women,
because their second-earner income would be taxed at an
effective tax rate that might exceed the maximum tax rate by
far.
2 Cf. op. cit., OECD, 1979, p. 42.
Referring to the loss of income minus payments from the
unemployment insurance.
4
For a proof cf. Edward M. Montgomery, Test of Alterate
Explanations of the Decline in the Personal Saving Rate.
Diss., Cambridge, Mass., 1982.- 11 -
vings ratio, which declines as a consequence.
In the United States, the female labor force participation is
much higher than in Germany. For the period from 1973 to 1987,
the average U.S. participation ratio of women was over 10 per-
centage points higher than the German one; in 1987, the dif-
ference even amounted to 13 percentage points. Thus it seems
reasonable that the higher level and the stronger increase in
the U.S. female labor force participation added to the personal
savings gap between the United States and Germany.
3. The Influence of Tax Policy on Consumption and Saving of
Private Households
Government policy which changes the return on savings or the
cost of consumption plays an important role in determining the
personal savings ratio. Therefore, it. has to be examined
whether a part of the U.S.-German savings gap can be explained
by differences in economic policy. This question is difficult
to answer, because economic policy affects the household's
propensity to save through various channels and not always in
the same direction. , - .
One aspect which should be looked at is the share of direct
taxes in total taxes. A general income tax (direct tax) is
likely to dampen a household's propensity to save, because it
also taxes interest income on savings, thereby discriminating
2
future consumption against current consumption. On the other
hand, a general consumption tax (indirect tax) does not affect
the household's decision of whether to consume a commodity
Cf. Victor R. Fuchs, "Economic Growth and the Rise of Service
Employment". In: Herbert Giersch (Ed.), Towards an Explana-
tion of Economic Growth, Kiel 1980, pp. 221-247.
2 . ! • .
This "substitution effect" is most likely only partly coun-
teracted by the "income effect" which makes it necessary for
the household to save more in order to be able to afford the
same consumption in the future;- 12 -
today or tomorrow, saving today less or more. Under these
conditions it is to be expected that the personal savings ratio
in a country tends to decline with an increase in the share of
direct taxes in total taxes. '
According to the statistics of government finance, this share
of direct taxes was on average 6 percentage points higher in
Germany than in the United States for the period from 1973 to
2
1987. According to the NIPA, the difference even amounted to
roughly 15 percentage points. Of course,'these numbers have to
be considered with caution due to the difficulty of categori-
zing some taxes as direct or indirect. But it is likely that
the higher share of direct taxes in the United States as
compared to Germany contributed to the lower savings propensity
of U.S. private households between 1973 and 1987.
A comparison of the effective rate at which income on capital
is taxed in each country should similarly indicate in which
country, saving is more discouraged. Although there is no exact
number available, there is good reason to believe that a
considerable part of such income is not reported and -con's e---
4 quently not properly taxed in Germany. In the United States,
on the other hand, savings institutions have to report interest
and other income on capital to the fiscus. This is one reason
why in the seventies the effective tax on capital income most
likely was higher in the United States than in Germany. Whether
Cf. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "Taxation and Savings: A Neoclas-
sical Perspective". Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 22,
1984, No. 4, pp. 1576-1629.
2
Cf. Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on Government Finance.
Washington 1986, and Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Finanz-
bericht 1989. Bonn 1988.
Cf. op. cit., Council of Economic Advisers, and Statistisches
Bundesamt, Der Staat in den Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrech-
nungen 1950-1987. Wiesbaden 1988.
4
The recent capital export from Germany in response to the
introduction of a 10 p.c.- tax of interest income at the
source on January 1, 1989 seems to confirm this presumption.Bibfiothefc
•eslnsHfufs fiir Welfwirtschaft
- 13 -
this still holds true for the eighties is less certain in view
of the various income tax reductions in the United States since
1981, only partly matched by the recent German tax reductions.
In addition, during the 15 years up to 1987, the inflation rate
in the United States was almost persistently higher than in
Germany (Figure 2). Therefore, nominal U.S. interest rates also
tended to exceed the corresponding German rates. Since taxes
are charged on nominal and not on real interest income, which
would be more appropriate, a higher inflation rate generally
leads to a lower real after-tax return on savings. This effect
is exacerbated by the fact that, with higher nominal income>
both the marginal and average tax rates rise due to the
progressivity of the income tax system. Hence the interaction































Percentage change of consumer prices from previous year.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. Paris, December 1988.- 14 -
of taxation and inflation most likely discouraged the house-
holds' propensity to save to a greater extent in the United
States than in Germany in the seventies and to a lesser extent
in the eighties.
Another important difference between the two countries was
until recently that the U.S. consumers were able to deduct
interest payments on consumer loans from their taxable income
(until 1986), whereas German households could not. Reinforced
by the high inflation rates and the progressivity of the tax
system in the United States particularly in the seventies, this
lowered the effective cost of consumption and most certainly
dampened saving. Since interest payments on mortgage loans are
still deductible (as they are in Germany), there has been an
increased incentive in recent years to finance consumption
expenditures through such loans.
Finally, in general there has been a much wider array of
explicit measures designed to stimulate household saving in
Germany than in the United States. These include bonuses paid
by the government under the socalled Savings Premium Law
(Spar-Pramiengesetz) and the Law on the Payment of Premiums for
Financing the Construction of Residential Properties (Woh-
nungsbau-Pramiengesetz), as well as special bonuses paid by
employers. They are all paid on the condition that the funds be
tied for a couple of years.
However, these measures which had been started after World
War II have been reduced over the years beginning in the mid-
seventies since the goal of these laws, to stimulate the accu-
Contrary to this view it is sometimes argued that higher
inflation implies higher real income uncertainty inducing the
households to increase their savings activity. However, the
observation that the savings rate tends to rise with the
inflation rate at the end of a cyclical upswing is not
sufficient to confirm this argument since the recessionary
fears which emerge at the end of the upswing could be reason
enough for the households to increase their savings.- 15 -
mulation of household wealth in Germany, has been considered
achieved. In addition, there is the possibility of deducting a
certain amount of contributions to private old-age insurance
from taxable income. This is similar to the socalled IRAs
(Individual Retirement Accounts) in the United States. Funds
deposited in these accounts are not taxed until the holder
withdraws them at the age of 59 or later. This saving incen-
tive, which has been widely discussed, was extended in 1981 and
2
restricted again in 1986.
On the whole, the evidence seems convincing that economic
policy during the 15 years up to 1987 was much more conducive
to personal saving in Germany than in the United States. This
is particularly true for the seventies, to a lesser extent for
the eighties.
4. Increase in Wealth
An increase in household wealth, e.g., through the rise in
stock prices, relative to disposable income can lower the
savings rate in two ways. First, the household may feel richer
and consume more out of his (unchanged) current income. Second,
if households consider the purchase of durable goods - contrary
to the usual definition - as wealth accumulation, then a sudden
increase in financial wealth would induce the households to
spend a larger share of their current income on consumer
durables to restore their optimal balance of physical and
financial wealth, thereby "saving" at a lower rate.
In 1975, all government premiums were restricted to medium-
and low-income earners. In November 1980, the possibility to
start new saving contracts under the Savings Premium Law was
abolished altogether. Hence, payments on such contracts have
been phased out in recent years. Cf. Bundesministerium der
Finanzen, 11. Subventionsbericht. Bonn 1987.
2
See, for example, Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, "Alter-
native Tax Rules and Saving Incentives: Microeconomic Data
and Behavioral Simulations". In: Martin Feldstein (Ed.),
Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis. Chicago
1983, pp. 173-210, and Michael J. Boskin, Reagan and the U.S.
Economy. San Francisco 1987.- 16 -
Between 1973 and 1987, the increase in U.S. stock prices barely
exceeded that of German share prices. However, the development
was quite different over the course of time. In Germany, the
upward movement of stock prices stopped at the end of 1985,
more or less stagnating at the achieved level until the end of
1987. In the United States, on the other hand, share prices
increased from the beginning of 1986 to the end of 1987 by more
than one third. This partly explains why the U.S. personal
savings rate has declined so strongly during recent years,
2
while the German savings rate has not.
5. Changes in Financial Markets
Another factor which seems to be important for the determina-
tion of the personal savings rate is the extent to which
households can borrow funds from the credit markets, and what
costs they incur in doing so. In the United States, contrary
to Germany, it is quite difficult to overdraw accounts. Since
the beginning of the seventies, this difficulty of financing
current expenditures which exceed current financial wealth has
more and more disappeared through the rapidly growing use of
credit cards. In addition, in connection with the deregulation
of financial markets there has been a trend towards backing
consumer credits through the issuing of bonds (securitization).
Together with increased competition, this has contributed to a
decline in interest rates. As a consequence, the credit rates,
e.g., for car loans, which roughly matched those of a personal
Even if it had not been the effect of changes in stock prices
on personal saving should have been less dramatic in Germany,
since the share of households owning stocks is below 10 p.c,
whereas it exceeds 20 p.c. in the United States.
2
The OECD calculated that the increase in U.S. stock wealth
relative to income from 1982 to mid-1987 explains 2.5 per-
centage points of the decline in the U.S. personal savings
rate. Cf. op. cit., OECD, 1987/1988, p. 130.
Cf. James Tobin, Walter Dolde, "Wealth, Liquidity and Con-
sumption". In: Consumer Spending and Monetary Policy: The
Linkages. Federal Reserve Board of Boston, Conference Series
No. 5, Boston, June 1971, pp. 99-146.-17-
2-year loan in the severities, have been much lower than the
latter during the eighties. Furthermore, the abolition of a
maximum level on mortgage rates has extended the mortgage
credits available considerably; previously, every cyclical
upswing with rising interest rates had dried out the mortgage
loan market. Recall-ing that during the period considered here
there was an increasing number of people in the younger age
group with a high demand for durable consumer goods, this
recent development in the U.S. financial markets - imitated
only very slowly in Germany - should have dampened the savings
rate of U.S. private households particularly in the eighties.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
During the fifteen years up to 1987, the savings activity of
private households was lower in the United States than in
Germany. This savings gap even has increased towards the end of
this period. It might be somewhat overstated by the official
rates due to differences in definition, but there.still remains
a noticeable difference in the savings behavior of the two
countries' households-.
There is a considerable number of reasons why from 1973 to 1987
U.S. households had a lower savings propensity than German
households. One important factor is the different age structure
of the population in the two countries. Another is the higher
and strongly increasing labor force participation of women in
the United States as compared to Germany. Furthermore, the
larger U.S. share of direct taxes in total tax revenue, as well
as a higher inflation rate and the possibility (until 1986) of
deducting interest payments on consumer loans from taxable
income has discouraged saving in the United States more than in
Germany. In addition, the German government took more measures
to stimulate saving explicitly, although these programs have
1 Cf. op. cit., OECD, 1987/1988, p. 113.- 18 -
been reduced over time. Finally, the changes in U.S. financial
markets and the comparatively high rise in stock prices have
contributed to the decline in the U.S. savings ratio during the
eighties.
In view of the changes of important determinants of the savings
ratios in both countries, it should be expected that, over
time, the U.S.-German gap in household saving will narrow
again. One reason for this conjecture is the future development
of the population in both countries. The U.S. babyboom genera-
tion is reaching the age at which the savings propensity is
relatively high, whereas the German babyboom generation is
still growing into the age group which saves comparatively
little. In addition, the influence of government policy on
saving is not as different in the two countries as it used to
be. The effective taxation of capital income has most likely
converged somewhat. Tax rates have been reduced more in the
United States than in Germany, and the difference between the
two countries' inflation rates has declined. Finally, in
Germany, the introduction of a 10 p.c. source tax on interest
income on January 1, 1989 and the phasing out of various
programs designed to stimulate saving should slightly dampen
the savings activity of German households.
Household saving is influenced by many variables and in many
directions at the same time. Not all of them could be discussed
here. In particular, due to their complexity, the possible
influence of the countries' social security systems and their
governments' debt on household saving have not been addressed
in this paper. They deserve further study. In addition, it
seems worthwhile trying to quantify effects the different
variables discussed here had on household saving. Finally, it
should be analyzed to what extent the propensity of households
and of different nations to save actually matters for the
long-run development of their economies, given the possibility
of importing capital from abroad.